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Taxing Consumption and Other Sins
James R. Hines Jr.
Federal and state governments in the United States use income and payrolltaxes as their primary tools to collect revenue. In the rest of the world,governments also use income and payroll taxes, but rely much more heavily
than does the United States on taxing consumption. Consumption taxes take many
forms, including general sales taxes, value-added taxes, and excise taxes on the
consumption of specific items including gasoline, alcohol, tobacco products, fire-
arms, air travel, telephone communication, and others.
The U.S. government does not use a value-added tax, making the United States
unique among high-income countries and a rarity in the larger world. As of 2004,
at least 134 countries rely on value-added taxes as a substantial source of funding.
Value-added taxes are sophisticated forms of sales taxes in which taxes are withheld
by businesses according to value added at every stage of production. American
states do impose sales taxes on broad categories of consumer purchases, but state
governments are considerably smaller than national governments, and their sales
tax rates are very low compared to the value-added tax rates used in the rest of the
world.
The United States also imposes unusually low excise taxes even after control-
ling for total tax collections, which are lower in the United States than they are in
most high-income countries. The deliberate social engineering that underlies the
selection of certain commodities for unusually high rates of taxation appeals less to
Americans than to residents of other countries. Moreover, the “sin” taxes on
purchases of commodities such as gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms are not
primarily imposed by the U.S. government for collecting substantial tax revenue for
general spending purposes—although excise taxes have been used that way in the
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past. Instead, excise taxes are intended to discourage consumption of the specific
taxed goods, thereby preventing some potential customers from contributing to
pollution, traffic congestion, injury, and poor health. As one example, the U.S. tax
on ozone-depleting chemicals is intended to provide incentives to discourage use of
these chemicals. In addition, these sin taxes raise revenue that the government can
use for targeted purposes like funding highway improvements, medical care, and
law enforcement efforts that combat some of the consequences of gasoline, alcohol,
tobacco, and firearms. For example, the federal tax on sport fishing equipment is
intended to raise money to cover costs that the government incurs in supporting
the taxed activity.
The absence of value-added taxation in the United States, together with the
very low rates of U.S. excise taxation, requires the U.S. government to rely more
heavily on income taxes to finance its activities. This reliance on income taxes has
three consequences. First, U.S. excise tax policy does relatively little to discourage
the consumption of particular goods that damage both the environment and the
individuals concerned. Second, it is difficult to tailor the income tax system to
charge individuals even roughly appropriate amounts for their use of specific
government services such as roads and health care. Third, and perhaps most
important, is that reliance on income taxation imposes a higher tax burden on
capital income than would be the case if the government instead made more
extensive use of consumption taxes. Capital income taxes discourage saving and
investing, and since the effects of capital income taxes compound over time, these
taxes are among the most distortionary of all taxes. Even a very low rate of capital
income taxation significantly increases the cost of consuming in the future relative
to consuming today, and this relative price distortion grows as the saving horizon
increases. While the “sin” of general consumption does not belong in quite the
same category as the sin of consuming alcohol or tobacco, or other potentially
harmful substances, the very low U.S. saving rate, and its consequences in reduced
prosperity for the elderly and for future generations, makes marginal consumption
look relatively sinful when compared to greater saving. The inefficiency associated
with taxing capital income increases with an economy’s exposure to international
capital flows, since rising international mobility makes a country’s capital stock
more sensitive to taxation, suggesting that the cost of not making more extensive
use of consumption taxes has been increasing in recent years.
Consumption Taxes in the United States
The primary consumption taxes used by the U.S. federal government are excise
taxes. Consumption taxes used by U.S. states include a combination of excise and sales
taxes. State governments rely more heavily on consumption taxes than does the
federal government, but the much smaller sizes of state governments imply that the
net consumption tax burden in the United States remains rather modest.
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Federal Excise Taxation
There is no federal value-added tax, no federal sales tax, and only a rather
modest assortment of federal excise taxes. Table 1 displays tax collections from
major federal excise taxes in 2004. In the 2004 federal budget, all excise taxes
together collected $71.8 billion, representing 4 percent of total revenues of
$1,797 billion. The federal tax on gasoline and related products accounts for
$32.6 billion, or 45 percent of total excise tax collections, with the remainder
consisting principally of federal taxes on tobacco (11 percent of total excise
taxes), air travel (8 percent), telephone service (8 percent), and various forms
of alcohol (12 percent).
Earlier American history includes periods in which federal excise taxes were
more important sources of revenue. To finance debts incurred in the Revolutionary
War and for which tariff revenues were insufficient, Congress in 1791 and 1794
introduced excise taxes on tobacco and snuff, refined sugar, distilled spirits,
carriages, and property sold at auction (Dewey, 1907, pp. 105–109). Some of these
taxes, including a subsequent 1797 stamp tax on the execution of various legal
documents, replicated the unpopular taxes that the British government had im-
posed on the American colonies. Indeed, in a 1774 address attempting to enlist
support from residents of Quebec, the Continental Congress had argued that
under British rule they were subject “to the impositions of EXCISE, the horror of
all free states” (Hu, 1950, p. 11), expressing a view that apparently changes with
perspective.
The new federal excises were not warmly embraced by all taxpayers. The tax on
distilled spirits drew fierce opposition in North Carolina and particularly in western
Pennsylvania, where it prompted open defiance, riots, and mob violence that
Table 1
Major U.S. Federal Excise Taxes
(in billions of dollars)
Total Collections in 2004: $71.8
Of which:
Gasoline, gasohol, diesel fuel $32.6
Telephone tax $5.8
Air transportation tax $6.0
Tobacco $7.9
Distilled spirits $4.3
Wine $0.8
Beer $3.6
Trucks, trailers, and tractors $2.2
Use of international air travel facilities $1.6
Use tax on heavy vehicles $0.9
Highway tires $0.4
Sports equipment $0.1
Firearms and ammunition $0.2
Unclassified $0.9
Source: Statistics of Income (2005).
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included destroying the property of those complying with the tax and tarring and
feathering of federal tax collectors. By 1794, the Whiskey Rebellion required
President George Washington to send troops to Pennsylvania to suppress the
insurrection and arrest its participants (Hu, 1950, pp. 19–28). The government of
Thomas Jefferson abolished all federal excises in 1802, balancing its budget instead
with tariffs, land sales, and military spending cuts (Dewey, 1907, p. 120).
The War of 1812 required new revenue sources, including the older excise
taxes and new ones on gold, jewelry, silverware, and watches, but when the war
concluded, Congress in 1817 repealed all federal excises (Dewey, 1907, pp. 139–
140). From 1817 until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the federal govern-
ment was funded exclusively by land sales and tariffs. At the start of the Civil War,
the federal government reinstituted its old excise taxes, and by 1862 had added new
excises on playing cards, feathers, patent medicines, billiard tables, leather, tele-
grams, yachts, and a host of other luxuries (p. 301). The federal government also
introduced a personal income tax, despite the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition
against federal income taxation, not to mention taxpayer outrage at its confiscatory
top tax rate of 5 percent. The income tax and many of the new excise taxes were
repealed following the Civil War, only to reappear briefly in the 1890s, when the
need to finance the Spanish–American war led at the end of the decade to the
doubling of federal taxes on beer and tobacco, and adoption of excise taxes on
exotic new products, among them chewing gum and telephone calls (p. 466).
Passage of the 16th amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 permitted the
federal government to levy a personal income tax, which quickly became the
mainstay of federal revenues, though it did not entirely supplant federal excise
taxes. Prohibition together with excise tax reductions dealt a serious blow to federal
excise tax collections between 1920 and 1933, but the repeal of Prohibition in 1933,
along with an expansion of other federal excises on Depression-era luxuries (in-
cluding gasoline, refrigerators, radios, phonograph records, candy and chewing
gum, matches, furs, jewelry, cameras, and soft drinks), helped to finance expanded
federal spending. Indeed, federal excise taxes collected more than 15 percent of
federal revenue in 1933 (Francis, 2000), and the repeal of Prohibition alone made
feasible federal alcohol tax collections in the range of $500 million to $600 million
per year during the 1930s, enough to finance more than a quarter of the roughly
$2 billion a year that Gruber and Hungerman (2005, p. 10) estimate that the
federal government spent on all New Deal relief programs combined.
The vastly broadened scope of the federal government during and following
World War II required substantially higher income taxes, but certain excise taxes
remained. The federal gasoline tax, introduced in 1933, discourages driving and
thereby reduces pollution and traffic congestion; furthermore, since 1956, federal
gas tax revenues have been parked in the Highway Trust Fund, which finances the
construction and maintenance of interstate highways and urban mass transit
projects. Indeed, because the federal gas tax serves in part as a fee for the use of
federal highways, other uses of fuel are exempt from this excise tax—including
non-highway business and farm use of gasoline and diesel fuel, and household
non-highway use of diesel fuel. Buyers who commit not to drive on interstate
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highways are entitled to purchase untaxed diesel fuel, to which the government
adds a strong dye that identifies any culprits caught on highways (by federal tax
inspectors) with untaxed fuel in their tanks. But of course, even off-highway use of
gasoline and diesel fuel produces pollution.
Environmental concerns prompted the federal government to introduce ex-
cise taxes on ozone-depleting chemicals in 1989, following the 1987 Montreal
Protocol, an international agreement intended to protect the Earth’s ozone layer.
The Montreal Protocol committed the United States to reduce production of
various ozone-depleting chemicals by 50 percent; since this goal might be accom-
plished either by restricting production directly or by imposing high taxes, the U.S.
government decided to do both. Congress initially believed that the quantity limits
would be the more restrictive of the two policies, driving up the prices of ozone-
depleting chemicals, and leaving the excise tax to serve the role of a windfall profit
tax on producers lucky enough to receive production quotas (Merrill and Rousso,
1991). But subsequent tax increases, together with changed market conditions,
drove actual production of ozone-depleting chemicals below the quota limits
(Fullerton, 1996), making federal taxes, and not the quotas, the determinants of
national production levels. In practice, the rates at which different chemicals and
their uses are taxed bear little resemblance to a tax finely tailored to reduce total
ozone depletion, because a well-designed tax would impose much higher rates on
activities more likely to release ozone-depleting chemicals into the atmosphere
(Barthold, 1994). Still, the net result of federal taxation has certainly been in the
desired direction.
The federal government imposes many other environmental excise taxes,
including a tax on the sale of gas-guzzler cars (those with fuel economy averages
below 22.5 miles per gallon), and taxes on other heavy road vehicles, highway-type
tires, and all forms of air transportation. In an interesting twist on “sin” taxation,
the federal government imposes a LUST tax of 0.1 cent per gallon on motor fuels
to fund its Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund. The original idea of
the LUST tax was to pay for cleanups of, yes, leaking underground fuel storage
tanks, but the LUST Trust Fund collects much more revenue than it spends each
year, its surplus seeping into the U.S. Treasury. The same pattern of annual
surpluses for many years characterized gas taxes earmarked for interstate highways,
though this pattern has reversed recently.
Many federal excise taxes, including the taxes on motor fuels, are designed to
raise revenue to finance government expenditures that promote the taxed activity.
For example, the 10 percent federal tax on fishing tackle, 3 percent tax on electric
outboard motors and fish-finding sonar devices, and a portion of motorboat fuel
tax revenues are cast into the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund, which finances
programs for boat safety and sport fish restoration. An 11 percent federal tax on
rifles, shotguns, firearm ammunition, and bows and arrows, together with a more
favorable 10 percent tax on pistols and revolvers, provides resources for the Wildlife
Restoration Project Fund. The money in this fund is distributed to states to help
them maintain ample supplies of targets by financing animal surveys and invento-
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ries, habitat research, hunter education programs, and management of wildlife
populations.
State Excise and Sales Taxation
American states have used a wide variety of consumption-based taxes through-
out their histories, though their heavier reliance on consumption taxes is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Early taxes in American colonies were largely poll taxes,
imposed on adult males with obligations that might vary by occupation; there were
also import duties, land taxes, and taxes on other property, such as houses, animals,
and ships. Excise taxes were used most heavily by the Middle Atlantic and New
England colonies, though almost all colonies taxed liquor production (Ely, 1888,
p. 114). New York, ever a leader in taxation, had taxes on wine and beer as early as
1650 (Sumner, 1891, p. 19) and taxes on tobacco, grain, hemp, flax, butter, and
cheese by 1653 (Ely, 1888, p. 110), and introduced a liquor sales tax in 1713.
Pennsylvania likewise had longstanding taxes on wine, rum, and other spirits, but
some colonies started much later, such as New Hampshire, which introduced its
excise taxes on wine, rum, cider, and tea only in 1756.
The colonies maintained multiple revenue sources upon graduating to state-
hood, and over the subsequent 218 years, the American states have relied on excise
taxes to varying degrees. Property taxes have always served as important revenue
sources, though in the twentieth century the use of income taxes expanded, and
consumption taxes came into their own. By 2004, property taxes accounted for
31.5 percent of total state and local revenues, with individual income taxes raising
21.3 percent, corporate income taxes 3.3 percent, excise taxes 11.5 percent, and
general sales taxes 24.2 percent.
Oregon adopted the first excise tax on gasoline in 1919, and within ten years
every state had one. Each state chooses its own gasoline tax, but they nonetheless
display a rough conformity. The left half of Table 2 presents 2006 state gasoline
sales tax rates (inclusive of additional fees and charges) for states with the highest
and lowest tax rates. The states vary from a high tax rate of 32.9 cents per gallon in
Wisconsin to lows of 8 cents per gallon in Alaska and 14 cents in Wyoming. States
have taxed tobacco for much longer than they have gasoline, and by 2006 managed
to acquire considerable diversity in their rates, as displayed on the right half of
Table 2. Rhode Island’s $2.46 per pack tax on cigarettes, and New Jersey’s $2.40 tax,
are breathtaking compared to the 7 cent tax per pack in South Carolina, the
17 cent tax per pack in Missouri, and the 18 cent tax per pack in Mississippi.
The U.S. federal government never taxed general sales, and the U.S. state
governments adopted general sales taxes only within the last century. In this, the
American states followed the rest of the world. As of 1918, only Germany among
large countries imposed a sales tax, and that at a paltry 0.1 percent rate; but the
postwar financial difficulties of European governments prompted several of them
to introduce sales taxes between 1918 and 1923. The idea had international appeal.
West Virginia was the first of the U.S. states to introduce a general sales tax, doing
so in 1921; it was followed by Georgia in 1929, and eleven more states in 1933, with
additional states following shortly thereafter. In the case of American states, the
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timing reflects the impact of the Great Depression. Falling state tax revenues due
to hard economic times, along with a desire to reduce property tax burdens in
order to prevent tax-driven foreclosures of property owners, motivated states to
look for new revenue sources that imposed burdens better tied to contemporane-
ous ability to pay.1 At present, the Great Depression is a distant memory, but
nevertheless, all but five states—Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and New
Hampshire—raise significant revenue with general sales taxes.
U.S. Consumption and Excise Taxation in World Perspective
The United States taxes consumption at very low rates compared to other
countries. Gasoline taxes are emblematic of this situation. As Table 2 indicates, U.S.
federal taxes on unleaded gasoline are currently 18.4 cents a gallon, and states
average 21.57 cents per gallon. The combined federal and state rate of 39.97 cents
per gallon gives the United States the third lowest gasoline tax rate among the
members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), which includes the 30 highest per capita income countries. The left half
of Table 3 displays excise taxes on unleaded gasoline in OECD countries in 2003,
rates that do not include value-added taxes, general sales taxes, or other charges
that apply to general commodities. Gasoline taxes in the United Kingdom are
1 Haig and Shoup (1934) review the history of sales taxation and offer a contemporaneous assessment
of the forces behind the adoption of sales taxes in American states.
Table 2
Federalism and Excise Tax Differences, 2006
Gasoline taxes (per gallon) Cigarette taxes (per pack)
“High” tax states “High” tax states
Wisconsin 32.9¢ Rhode Island $2.46
Pennsylvania 31.2¢ New Jersey $2.40
Rhode Island 31¢ Washington $2.03
Washington 31¢ Michigan $2.00
North Carolina 30.15¢ Maine $2.00
“Low” tax states “Low” tax states
Georgia 15.3¢ Kentucky 30¢
Florida 14.9¢ Virginia 30¢
New Jersey 14.5¢ Tennessee 20¢
Wyoming 14¢ Mississippi 18¢
Alaska 8¢ Missouri 17¢
South Carolina 7¢
U.S. state average 21.57¢ 91.7¢
U.S. federal government 18.4¢ 39¢
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators, http://www.taxadmin.org.
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6.7 times higher than in the United States, and there is not a single country in
Europe whose gasoline taxes are less than 2.75 times higher than those in the
United States. Japan’s tax rate is more than four times higher than the U.S. rate,
and Korea’s 5.5 times higher. Only Canada and Mexico among OECD countries
have lower gasoline taxes than the United States. While it does not necessarily
follow that the rest of the world is right in taxing gasoline heavily, these compari-
sons do show that the United States and its North American neighbors differ
sharply from most other countries in this way.
Gasoline is not the only fuel that the United States taxes very lightly. The U.S.
average (federal plus state) tax rate of $9.20 per liter of distilled alcohol ranks 20th
out of the 26 OECD countries for which comprehensive data are available for 2003.
The right half of Table 3 presents these average tax rates. The Scandinavian
countries, Ireland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom all tax hard alcohol at rates
more than 3.4 times that of the United States, whereas only the Czech Republic,
Spain, Canada, Italy, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary have lower tax rates.
National tax rates on wine, beer, tobacco, and other products can be more difficult
Table 3
Gasoline and Alcohol Excise Taxes in OECD Countries, 2003
Tax per 1000 liters of unleaded gasoline Tax per 100 liters of alcohol
United Kingdom $758.97 Norway $7855.90
Germany 687.29 Iceland 6389.57
Norway 670.06 Sweden 5778.25
Finland 650.75 Ireland 4121.64
Netherlands 647.37 Denmark 3889.05
Korea, Republic of 627.65 Turkey 3604.06
France 618.72 United Kingdom 3151.90
Italy 568.99 Finland 2966.53
Denmark 566.53 Switzerland 2100.24
Portugal 548.78 Netherlands 1863.93
Sweden 542.78 Belgium 1744.10
Switzerland 529.55 France 1522.65
Turkey 525.76 Germany 1368.28
Belgium 518.28 Poland 1146.20
Iceland 484.06 New Zealand 1134.45
Japan 470.28 Luxembourg 1093.30
Hungary 461.51 Austria 1050.10
Austria 427.39 Greece 953.49
Ireland 421.47 Portugal 943.12
Luxembourg 400.17 United States 920.00
Spain 390.31 Czech Republic 779.69
Poland 390.23 Spain 719.48
Czech Republic 361.19 Canada 703.85
Slovak Republic 314.09 Italy 677.69
Greece 310.83 Slovak Republic 633.25
Australia 214.17 Hungary 7.45
New Zealand 189.71
United States 112.80
Canada 63.61
Mexico 0.07
Source: OECD (2005).
Note: The table presents excise taxes (in U.S. dollars) on unleaded gasoline and on distilled
alcohol in OECD countries in 2003.
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to compare across countries, since the rates vary with prices and product attributes,
but in each of these areas the United States classifies as a low-tax country.
Composition of Total Tax Revenues
One of the reasons why U.S. excise tax rates are low is that the United States
has a smaller government sector than do most OECD countries, so all U.S. tax rates
tend to look low by comparison. One way to control for government size differences
among countries is to consider the relative contributions of different revenue
sources. However, such comparisons do little to change the impression produced
by simple examination of tax rates.
It is instructive to compare ratios of revenues from specific taxes to total tax
collections for OECD countries in 2000. The numerator in this ratio includes
revenues from excise taxes and other charges that are product-specific, including
customs duties and taxes on insurance and certain financial operations. For the
United States, federal plus state and local revenues from specific taxes represent
6.3 percent of total tax collections, the lowest of any OECD country (OECD, 2005,
p. 25). Members of the European Union collected an average of 10.2 percent of
their government revenue from specific taxes, and for the OECD as a whole
(including the United States) the average was 11.7 percent, close to double the
corresponding U.S. figure.
American exceptionalism is likewise evident in environmental taxation, the
intensity of which can be measured by ratios of revenues from environmental taxes
to total tax collections in 2000. The numerator of this ratio includes tax collections
(defined to exclude user fees) on energy products, motor vehicles and other
transportation, waste management, ozone-depleting substances, and what the
OECD (2005) refers to as “other.” In 2000 the United States collected only
3.4 percent of its total government revenues from environmental taxes, making its
tax system the least environmentally oriented of any OECD country. The next
lowest ratios are Canada, at 3.8 percent, and New Zealand, at 4.7 percent; the
OECD average (including the United States) is 5.5 percent, and the European
Union average is 6.7 percent, double that of the United States (OECD, 2005,
p. 111). Even these comparisons understate the extent to which the U.S. tax system
differs from other countries in effectively protecting the environment, since the
relatively small size of the U.S. public sector means that tax differences do corre-
spondingly little to change the relative prices of activities that harm the environ-
ment.
Value-Added Taxes
Value-added taxation, as practiced by most of the world, is simply a form of
general sales taxation. However, instead of being collected exclusively from the
end-user, as with U.S. state-level sales taxes, a value-added tax is collected from
businesses as they sell their output to intermediate and final buyers. Each firm first
calculates the value-added tax on its total revenues, and then takes a tax credit for
taxes paid by firms from whom they bought any intermediate inputs. Because each
firm has an incentive to report fully what it purchased from other firms, the
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value-added tax facilitates tax enforcement by requiring purchasers to produce
records of sales by other firms in order to claim value-added tax credits. Also, the
crediting aspect of value-added taxation ensures that sales taxes are not com-
pounded on goods that require multiple stages of production. As a result, value-
added taxes are efficient and effective revenue collection devices, making them
popular with governments, though perhaps less so with some taxpayers. Metcalf
(1995) and Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and Summers (2001) describe the virtues and
practice of value-added taxation.
The widespread adoption of value-added taxes is the major tax event of the
second half of the twentieth century. As late as 1966, only two countries (Coˆte
d’Ivoire and Senegal) had introduced value-added taxes; by 1985, 35 countries had
done so; and in 2004, 134 countries collected significant tax revenue with value-
added taxes. Every OECD country other than the United States uses value-added
taxes; the left half of Table 4 displays their basic value-added tax rates during 2000.
The average value-added tax rate in OECD countries other than the United States
is 17.7 percent, though considerable variation exists, with Denmark, Hungary, and
Sweden at the high end imposing 25 percent VAT rates, and Japan, Canada, and
Switzerland at the low end all using value-added tax rates in the range of 5.0 to
7.5 percent.
The modest rates at which U.S. states tax general sales, together with the
absence of a value-added tax, implies that the United States taxes general consump-
tion at lower rates than any other OECD country. The right half of Table 4 presents
ratios of revenues from general consumption taxes to total tax collections for
OECD countries in 2000. The general consumption tax revenues in the numerator
of this ratio include those raised by value-added taxes, the roughly equivalent goods
and services taxes used by some countries, and general sales taxes; this category
excludes excise taxes and other specific taxes. In the United States, 7.6 percent of
all tax revenue comes from general consumption taxes, the lowest fraction in the
OECD; the next lowest fractions belong to Japan, at 8.9 percent, Australia, at
12.1 percent, and Switzerland, at 13.1 percent. The average contribution of general
consumption taxes to total tax revenue in the European Union is 18.4 percent, and
the OECD average is 18.5 percent. While the difference between the 7.6 percent
U.S. ratio of general consumption taxes to total taxes and the OECD average of
18.5 percent may not appear dramatic in the grand scheme of government finance,
if you remove payroll taxes and other social insurance contributions from consid-
eration, the difference in the fractions would look much bigger.
How Anomalous is U.S. Consumption Tax Policy?
U.S. consumption tax policy differs sharply from the policies adopted by other
countries. To what extent are these differences explainable across countries by
factors such as differences in per capita income, government centralization, and
openness of the economy?
Table 5 presents univariate regressions in which the dependent variables are
measures of the extent to which countries rely on consumption taxes in raising
government revenue. The dependent variable in the regressions presented in
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columns 1–3 is the ratio of excise tax collections to total tax revenue, the sample
consisting of the 26 OECD countries for which the relevant data are available for
2000. The –5.081 coefficient on log of per capita GDP in column one indicates that
10 percent higher per capita national income is associated with a 0.51 percent lower
ratio of excise to total taxes. Since the mean ratio of excise to total taxes is
11.1 percent, 10 percent higher per capita income is associated with a 4.6 percent
decline in excise tax collections. Even among wealthy countries, those with higher
incomes rely somewhat less heavily on excise taxes than do others—or, to put the
same matter differently, rely rather more heavily on income and other taxes.
The regression reported in the second column of Table 5 explains the fraction
of excise taxes in total tax collections as a function of the extent to which the
central government accounts for a country’s total (central plus subnational) gov-
ernment expenditures. The mean of this centralization measure is 72.3 percent in
the sample of OECD countries. The 0.168 coefficient in column two implies that
centralized governments rely more heavily on excise taxes than do other countries,
such as the United States, that have decentralized structures. The coefficient
Table 4
Value-added Tax Rates and General Consumption Taxes, 2000
Value-added tax rates (percent) General consumption taxes/total taxes
Denmark 25.0 Iceland 29.7%
Hungary 25.0 Hungary 26.1
Sweden 25.0 New Zealand 24.7
Iceland 24.5 Turkey 24.2
Norway 23.0 Portugal 23.2
Slovak Republic 23.0 Ireland 23.1
Czech Republic 22.0 Slovak Republic 22.3
Finland 22.0 Poland 22.0
Poland 22.0 Greece 21.8
Belgium 21.0 Denmark 19.5
Ireland 21.0 Norway 19.2
France 20.6 Austria 18.8
Austria 20.0 Mexico 18.7
Italy 20.0 Germany 18.4
Greece 18.0 Czech Republic 18.3
Netherlands 17.5 United Kingdom 18.2
United Kingdom 17.5 Spain 17.5
Portugal 17.0 Finland 17.4
Turkey 17.0 Netherlands 17.4
Germany 16.0 Korea, Republic of 17.0
Spain 16.0 France 16.8
Luxembourg 15.0 Sweden 16.8
Mexico 15.0 Belgium 16.3
New Zealand 12.5 Italy 15.4
Australia 10.0 Luxembourg 15.0
Korea, Republic of 10.0 Canada 14.3
Switzerland 7.5 Switzerland 13.1
Canada 7.0 Australia 12.1
Japan 5.0 Japan 8.9
United States 0.0 United States 7.6
Sources: International Monetary Fund and OECD (2005).
Note: The second column of the table presents value-added tax rates in 2000; the fourth
column presents ratios of general consumption taxes to total taxes (measured in percent-
ages) for 2000.
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implies that a 10 percent greater share of central government spending is associ-
ated with a 1.7 percent higher ratio of excise to total taxes, which is roughly
15 percent of the ratio’s mean value of 11.1 percent.
The regression reported in the third column of Table 5 expresses the ratio of
excise taxes to total taxes as a function of economic openness, which is defined as
the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP. The mean value of economic
openness among the 26 OECD countries is 92.6 percent, though the value for the
U.S. economy with its enormous internal market is only 26.2 percent. The 0.027
coefficient in the regression indicates that greater economic openness is associated
with stronger reliance on excise taxes; its magnitude implies that increasing the
openness of the U.S. economy to the OECD average level would increase excise tax
collections by 1.8 percent of total taxes.
The dependent variable in the regressions presented in columns 4–6 of Table
5 is the ratio of the sum of VAT and general sales tax revenue to total tax
collections. This measure of reliance on general consumption taxation has a mean
of 24.2 percent for the sample of 25 OECD countries in 2000. The independent
variables are the same as those in columns 1–3. The –16.909 coefficient in column
Table 5
Effect of Country Characteristics on Structure of Tax Revenue for
OECD Countries, 2000
Dependent variables:
Excise revenue as a percentage
of total tax revenue
VAT and sales tax revenue as a percentage
of total tax revenue
Constant 61.756 1.072 8.564 193.416 2.890 21.400
(24.688) (2.421) (1.352) (31.814) (7.867) (4.036)
Log of per
capita GDP
5.081
(2.500)
16.909
(3.262)
Degree of
government
centralization
0.168
(0.031)
0.374
(0.104)
Openness of
economy
0.027
(0.011)
0.030
(0.040)
No. of
observations
26 26 26 25 25 25
R 2 0.318 0.463 0.153 0.482 0.373 0.031
Sources: For “Per capita GDP” and “Openness of economy,” the Penn World Tables, edition 6.1; data for
“Degree of government centralization” and the dependent variables from the January 2006 edition of
IMF Government Finance Statistics.
Notes: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. “Per capita GDP” is measured in current U.S.
dollars, and “Openness of economy” is measured as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP.
“Degree of government centralization” is measured as central government expenditure divided by the
sum of central, state, and local government expenditure. The dependent variables measure specific tax
revenues collected by the central (and where available state and local) government, divided by the sum
of central, state, and local government tax collections.
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four implies that 10 percent higher per capita national income is associated with a
1.69 percent lower ratio of general consumption taxes to total taxes, a decline of
7 percent of its mean value. The 0.374 coefficient in column five implies that a
10 percent greater share of central government spending is associated with a
3.7 percent higher ratio of general consumption taxes to total taxes, representing
15 percent of its mean value. The 0.030 coefficient in column six, while not
statistically significant, suggests that greater economic openness is associated with
stronger reliance on general consumption taxes.
The regressions presented in columns one and two of Table 6 repeat the
regressions reported in Table 5, except that they use multivariate specifications
that include all three independent variables. The results are similar to those
implied by Table 5, though the magnitude of the effect of government central-
ization is diminished by roughly half in moving to the multivariate specifica-
tions. The dependent variable in the regression reported in column three of
Table 6 is the ratio of the sum of excise taxes and general consumption taxes to
total tax collections; this variable has a mean of 34.4 percent (though a U.S.
value of only 13.9 percent). The estimated –9.183 coefficient in column three
implies that this measure of consumption taxation is negatively affected by per
capita income, though this effect is not statistically significant. The estimated
0.404 coefficient implies that a 10 percent greater share of central government
spending is associated with a 4.0 percent higher ratio of consumption taxes to
Table 6
Determinants of Structure of Tax Revenue for OECD Countries, 2000
Dependent variables:
Excise/
total taxes
(VAT  sales)/
total taxes
(Excise  VAT  sales)/
total taxes
Constant 44.437 152.476 92.797
(21.033) (24.786) (109.754)
Log of per capita GDP 4.231 14.293 9.183
(1.920) (2.239) (9.898)
Degree of government
centralization 0.091 0.165 0.404
(0.037) (0.104) (0.182)
Openness of economy 0.025 0.030 0.043
(0.010) (0.016) (0.029)
No. of observations 26 25 26
R 2 0.654 0.602 0.484
Sources: See Table 5.
Notes: “Sales” means “sales taxes.” “Per capita GDP” is measured in current U.S. dollars, and “Openness
of economy” is measured as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. “Degree of government
centralization” is measured as central government expenditure divided by the sum of central, state, and
local government expenditure. The dependent variables measure specific tax revenues collected by the
central (and where available state and local) government, divided by the sum of central, state, and local
government tax collections. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses.
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total taxes, and the 0.043 coefficient on economic openness suggests that
greater openness likewise leads to greater reliance on consumption taxes.
The regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 display patterns in which
high-income countries, those with decentralized political structures, and those
with economies that have relatively lower levels of international trade rely
relatively little on consumption taxes. However, the magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients are not enough to explain the U.S. avoidance of explicit consumption
taxes. The regressions in Table 6 were rerun without data for the United States,
and the resulting coefficient estimates (which do not differ much from those
reported in Table 6) used to predict U.S. values of the dependent variables. The
differences between predicted and actual U.S. consumption taxes indicate that,
even after controlling for observable country differences, the United States has
unusually low rates of consumption taxation. The most sizable effect appears in
the ratio of excise taxes to total taxes, where the predicted value of 6.2 percent
for the United States greatly exceeds the actual U.S. ratio of 2.4 percent. This
difference largely reflects the very low gasoline tax rates in the United States.
There is a more modest difference between the predicted 12.2 percent ratio of
U.S. value-added tax plus sales taxes to total taxes and the actual ratio of 11.5
percent, but again a significant difference between the predicted 19.7 percent
ratio of aggregate consumption taxes to total taxes and the actual U.S. ratio of
13.9 percent. Controlling for economic conditions and the U.S. version of
federalism does not dispel the impression that the low rates of consumption
taxation in the United States involve some anomalous political choices.
Shifting Toward Consumption Taxes?
The United States could shift toward collecting a greater share of its taxes in
the form of consumption taxes in several ways: by reforming its income tax to
reduce the taxation of capital income; by enacting a value-added tax and using the
revenue to reduce capital income taxation; or by expanding its current consump-
tion taxes.
The United States income tax has recently taken some mild steps in the
direction of consumption taxation by exempting from tax some portions of the
return to saving. Since all income must be either consumed or saved, completely
exempting saving (or what is equivalent, the return to saving) from taxation would
mean that only consumption is taxed. Permitting individuals to accumulate pen-
sion assets tax-free, and also to use tax-preferred savings accounts and other devices
to shelter some portion of income derived from saving, moves the system toward
taxing consumption. While corporate income in the United States continues to be
taxed at high rates by international standards, the 2003 reductions in personal taxes
on dividend income, together with favorable taxation of long-term capital gains,
attenuates some of the effect at the personal level.
Despite these recent efforts to reduce the taxation of capital income, the U.S.
federal government has refused to embrace explicit consumption taxation as
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embodied in a value-added tax. The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform (2005) proposed a new “Growth and Investment Tax” with many consump-
tion tax features, including cash-flow business taxation and significantly reduced
individual taxation of capital income, but even this proposal retains some capital
income taxation, and the panel report stopped short of recommending a new
value-added tax alternative for the United States. Broad-based consumption taxes
such as value-added taxes clearly have enormous international appeal, and they do
not affect the return to saving and investing as long as tax rates do not change over
time. In contrast, income taxes, such as corporate income taxes, and personal
income taxes that include returns to saving and investing, are extremely distortion-
ary, since their effects compound over time. As a consequence, efficient tax
configurations typically entail zero capital income taxation over long time horizons,
since there exist much more efficient alternatives with the same distributional
properties as capital taxes.
The evidence surveyed in Auerbach and Hines (2002), along with the more
recent calculations of Feldstein (2006), suggests that the average efficiency cost
associated with raising one dollar of government revenue with commonly used U.S.
tax instruments may be as high as 75 cents or more, with the deadweight loss of
capital income taxes significantly higher than the average. Countries exposed to
elastic international capital flows have separate incentives not to attempt to tax
capital income, as these countries must offer international investors market rates of
return, from which it follows that any attempt to tax foreigners simply distorts the
economy without extracting greater resources from foreigners (Gordon and Hines,
2002). Extensive evidence surveyed in Hines (1999) suggests that high source-based
capital taxes, such as corporate income taxes, significantly distort local economies
by discouraging foreign investment. Since the costs of taxing foreigners are borne
by domestic factors in the form of lower wages and land prices, and these costs
include deadweight losses due to inefficient taxation, domestic residents are made
better off by removing any taxes on foreign investors and instead directly taxing the
returns to local factors of production. From this perspective, it is not surprising that
governments around the world embrace value-added taxes and other consumption
taxes that do not have the undesirable features of capital taxes.
One of the political obstacles that a value-added tax or any other broad-based
consumption tax must overcome in the United States is the concern, in some
circles, that such taxes are too efficient at raising revenue, thereby too easily
accomodating big government. While little econometric evidence supports the
notion that the adoption of a value-added tax encourages government growth (for
example, Metcalf, 1995, p. 136), it is noteworthy that Michigan, the only state in the
country to use a value-added tax instead of a corporate income tax, taxed businesses
more heavily with its value-added tax than did any other state with corporate
income taxes during the years when Michigan’s value-added tax was in place
(Hines, 2003, p. 607).
A second important political obstacle facing any new U.S. value-added tax
proposal is distributional, grounded in the argument that a value-added tax would
be significantly less progressive than the current U.S. income tax system. The
James R. Hines Jr. 63
relevance of this concern depends entirely on what other changes in the U.S. tax
system would accompany the adoption of a value-added tax. The U.S. government
could adopt a value-added tax and simultaneously adjust the personal income tax
schedule to produce a tax system with the same, or even more progressive, distri-
butional features as the current tax system. For example, Michael Graetz (2002) has
proposed one version of such a comprehensive U.S. tax reform that includes a
15 percent value-added tax, elimination of personal taxes on the first $100,000 of
income, reduction of payroll taxes for low-income workers, and other features
designed to maintain progressivity.
If dramatic changes to income taxes or implementation of a value-added tax
encounter political obstacles, another approach to swinging the U.S. tax system
toward a greater emphasis on consumption taxation would be to increase state sales
taxes or state and federal excise taxes. States already rely heavily on sales and excise
taxes, and their relatively small revenue requirements give states considerably less
scope for comprehensive consumption-oriented tax reform than is the case for the
federal government. But greater federal reliance on excise taxes would require
addressing some difficult theoretical, distributional, and practical concerns.
The received theoretical wisdom is that excise taxes can correct market failures
that accompany externalities by having the tax rates set equal to marginal external
damages caused by consumption of the taxed good. This insight, commonly
attributed to Pigou (1920), suggests that excise taxes may be used in lieu of other
regulatory mechanisms to discourage activities that consumers would otherwise
overdo. Strict application of this logic requires sensitive tailoring of excise taxes to
reflect differences in marginal damages over time and between situations, but even
in the absence of perfect design, excise taxes can mitigate the problems that would
otherwise accompany congestion, pollution, and other externalities.
There is considerable controversy over the level of excise taxation necessary to
correct externalities in practice. Assuming that the government is unable to distin-
guish taxes on a customer’s first drink of alcohol, which has no external costs, from
taxes on the seventh drink just prior to driving a car, which has considerable
external costs, appropriate corrective policy entails a compromise between correct-
ing externalities and distorting ordinary consumer decisions. A similar logic applies
to the costs of smoking, air pollution, traffic congestion, and other externalities.
Cnossen and Smart (2005) conclude from their survey of the literature that a purely
externality-correcting tobacco tax would be much lower than existing tobacco taxes
in Europe and the United States, whereas Pogue and Sgontz (1989) maintain that
externality-correcting alcohol taxes would be twice the existing U.S. levels, and
Kenkel (1996) argues that U.S. alcohol taxes would need to be four to five times
current levels to correct for externalities properly. Gasoline taxes serve both to
reduce traffic congestion and to improve air and climate quality, on the basis of
which Parry and Small (2004) find that externality-correcting gasoline tax rates for
the United States are slightly more than double current tax levels.
Excise taxes might also play a role in discouraging the consumption of goods
that may not have external effects, but are nonetheless harmful to the individuals
who consume them. Examples of such goods include tobacco products, alcohol,
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and food with poor nutritional content (or any food in excess of healthy levels).2
Irrational consumers may begin consuming these items without fully appreciating
the regret they will experience years later, and experience what have been called
“internalities.” In such settings, excise taxation might help consumers by making
the overconsumption of such goods more expensive, and therefore less likely.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) analyze optimal excise taxation in settings in
which individuals have self-control problems (but governments do not), and Gru-
ber and Koszegi (2004) and Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) offer applications to
cigarette taxes.
One concern frequently expressed about excise taxation is the potential
regressivity of the resulting tax burdens.3 The concern is that because the poor tend
to spend higher fractions of their income than do the wealthy, taxes based on
expenditure rather than income will put greater relative burdens on low-income
individuals. Two important considerations should be borne in mind in evaluating
the distributional effects of excise taxation. First, the progressivity of excise taxes
should be evaluated from a lifetime perspective; for example, it would be a mistake
to infer from the fact that affluent retirees might have little current income but
significant current expenditures that excise taxes are regressive. Since lifetime
(including intergenerational) consumption tracks lifetime income very closely,
flat-rate excise taxes look much like flat-rate income taxes from a progressivity
standpoint. Excise taxes could have different effects on certain groups in the
population; for example, excise taxes designed to protect the environment might
impose greater relative burdens on low-income individuals. Poterba (1989, 1991)
and Walls and Hanson (1999) analyze U.S. gasoline taxes from the standpoint of
lifetime incidence, finding that gasoline consumption rises more than proportion-
ally with affluence over much of the range of total spending, suggesting that
gasoline taxes are progressive, albeit less so than income taxes.
The second and more important consideration is that, as with a value-added
tax, excise tax burdens must be understood in the context of the broader tax
system. If, in the course of pursuing environmental or other objectives, a country
adopts excise taxes that unduly burden one segment of the income distribution, the
government can, if it wishes, undo this distributional shift by adjusting its income
tax schedule. As Kaplow (2006) notes, selecting excise taxes can for this reason be
done without undermining distributional and other policy objectives.4 Conversely,
excise taxes are not the best tool for pursuing progressivity; they have a different
2 These goods may also be responsible for externalities, through such mechanisms as second-hand
smoke, traffic accidents associated with alcohol, and government policies that provide benefits to
individuals and families harmed by overconsumption. Such externalities carry straightforward implica-
tions for corrective taxation, but there remains the question of whether any additional tax is warranted
due to the failure of individual optimization.
3 Excise taxes also raise enforcement concerns, as do all taxes. In the United Kingdom, which boasts the
highest cigarette taxes in Europe, one in five cigarettes is purchased on the black market (Cnossen and
Smart, 2005, p. 45).
4 This argument, which applies the findings of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), requires that preferences
be weakly separable between consumption and leisure, a restriction that, while unlikely to be strictly
satisfied, does little to reduce the power of the argument.
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purpose and a different strength. Excise taxes on luxury items—such as the U.S.
federal taxes on expensive furs and jewelry, luxury cars, personal aircraft, and yachts,
introduced in 1990 and since expired—are generally less effective, and indeed never
more effective, at redistributing income than are income tax alternatives.
Naturally, practical implementation of excise taxation differs from the ideal
tax systems analyzed in theory. For example, ample international evidence suggests
that gasoline taxes and other taxes intended to protect the environment are not
designed in ways that achieve maximal environmental protection for any given level
of total tax burden (Barde and Braathen, 2005). In part, this finding reflects that
consumption of the same good in different places or at different times may have
quite divergent environmental impact, while as a practical matter it is extremely
difficult to design tax rates that fit these differences. In addition, political processes
offer no guarantees that environmental taxes will be set with only environmental
considerations in mind. Widespread use of excise taxation focuses business inter-
ests in reducing tax rates on the commodities that they sell, thereby encouraging
extensive political lobbying and the problems that accompany it. Moreover, the tax
burdens that accompany excise taxes may or may not be offset by compensating
income tax changes. Political infighting need not produce harmonious or efficient
constellations of taxes.
Conclusion
Throughout most of American history, federal and state governments have
relied on excise taxes to collect significant revenues, with the modern era a notable
exception. The absence of value-added taxation in the United States, together with
modest state sales taxes and an unwillingness to intrude on individuals’ lives by
imposing “sin” taxes at rates resembling those of other countries, leaves the United
States taxing consumption very lightly by international standards.
Heavy American reliance on income rather than consumption taxation has
not served the U.S. economy well. The inefficiency associated with taxing the
return to capital means that the tax system reduces investment in the United
States and distorts intertemporal consumption by Americans, meanwhile dis-
couraging U.S. labor supply no less than would a consumption tax alternative.
While the economic logic of consumption taxation is compelling even for a
closed economy, it is even more powerful for an open economy exposed to the
world capital market. Consumption taxes in the form of excises can be designed
to help protect the environment and control other externalities, whereas it is
much more difficult to pursue the same goals with income taxes. Excise taxes
can also serve the function of more closely aligning tax burdens with the
benefits that taxpayers receive from certain government services. Understand-
able concerns arise about the distributional consequences of consumption
taxation, but a system that relies heavily on consumption taxes, particularly if
accompanied by an income tax, can be as progressive as any income tax the
United States would realistically want to adopt.
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Will the United States, in time, come to resemble more closely the rest of the
world, perhaps by adopting higher gasoline taxes or a national value-added tax?
The opposition to higher gasoline taxes in the United States seems powerful and
bipartisan. As to the prospects for a value-added tax, the old line is that the United
States does not have a value-added tax because Democrats think it is regressive, and
Republicans think it is too easy to raise revenue with one; the country will get a
value-added tax, the line continues, once Republicans realize that it is regressive
and Democrats realize that it is easy to raise revenue with one. Perhaps more likely
is that the United States will seriously entertain new consumption-oriented tax
alternatives only when confronting a financial crisis that admits no easy solution
and cannot be ignored. After all, the need to finance sudden wartime expenditures
accounts for many of the past innovations in U.S. taxation. But the political system
may yet prove itself capable of creating periodic crises even in the absence of
external enemies, thereby furnishing opportunities to consider adopting tax mea-
sures that have proved attractive in the rest of the world.
y I thank Tomislav Ladika for outstanding research assistance, and Kathryn Dominguez,
Andrei Shleifer, Timothy Taylor, and Michael Waldman for extremely helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
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